

The Director,
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta,
cordially invites you to the R. C. Dutt Lectures of 2018



**R. C. Dutt Lectures
on Political Economy**

to be delivered by

Professor Sudipto Dasgupta,
Department of Finance, Chinese University of Hong Kong

on

“Gender and Finance”

Wednesday, November 14, 2018, 3 pm

and

Thursday, November 15, 2018, 3 pm

**Venue: CSSSC, Seminar Room 2
R-1 Baishnabghata-Patuli Township, Kolkata 700 094
Phone : 033-24625794 / 5795 / 7252**

Prof. Sudipto Dasgupta is a Professor at the Department of Finance, Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has held academic positions at Lancaster University (as Distinguished Professor of Finance), The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, The Jawaharlal Nehru University, The Indian Statistical Institute, and The University of Southern California. He has been the Managing Editor of the International Review of Finance since 2008 and is a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economics Research (ABFER). He was a board member of the FIRS from 2013-2015 and a member of the Nomination Committee of the American Finance Association in 2011. Prof. Dasgupta obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Southern California in 1988. He has broad interests with a focus on Corporate Finance.

Prof. Dasgupta's early work was on Applied Game Theory and Theory of Industrial organization. He worked on the design of procurement auctions and on takeover bidding environments. He later worked on topics such as the role of firm leverage on worker-firm bargaining, on information sharing among competing firms in an Oligopolistic market structure, and the effect of leverage on product market outcomes. His recent work includes empirical papers on issues like capital structure policy of firms, effect of financial constraints on firm behaviour, inventory investment and allocation of cash among alternative uses, reputational effects of large customer accounts on loan spreads of supplier firms, whether managerial labor market rewards top executives for their perceived ability, whether more intense product market competition increases firm efficiency by accelerating replacement of less efficient managers, and so on.